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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a brief scenario.' Jacob owns forty acres of pristine property near
the Green Mountains in Vermont and looks forward to building a home there
after he retires. But to his dismay, the State of Vermont decides to build a
nuclear power plant on his land. Of course, Jacob demands payment for such an
imposition. The State, though, refuses to compensate him, and the Vermont
Supreme Court upholds that refusal. No payment is required, rules the court,
because an implicit easement-the power plant easement-authorizes the State
to build power plants on private land without providing compensation. Jacob
appeals his case to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the state has
taken from him a property right-the right to exclude nuclear power plants from
his land-without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Assuming that the power plant easement did not exist before the Vermont
Supreme Court's decision, the court has altered property law in such a way as to
take from Jacob a property right. If the Vermont legislature had enacted the
power plant easement by statute, without a doubt the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment would require it to pay him just compensation. But because a
court took his property, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would apply
the Fifth Amendment to Jacob's case.
Recently, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (STBR), 2 the Supreme Court heard a judicial takings
claim based on facts analogous to the hypothetical situation described above.
Six justices agreed that the Constitution limits the ability of state courts to
redefine property rights. But only four of the six justices wanted to apply the
Takings Clause to the case. The other two preferred to apply the Due Process
Clause. Furthermore, the justices disagreed over whether the remedy for a
judicial taking should involve compensation for the property owner or
invalidation of the taking court's decision. In short, the Court made very little
progress in establishing a definitive approach to judicial takings claims.
A clearly defined approach to judicial takings claims is desirable for several
reasons. First, STBR provides lower courts with very little guidance for deciding
judicial takings claims. After STBR, it is still unclear how courts should analyze
I With the addition of a few embellishments, this hypothetical was proposed by Justice
Breyer during oral argument in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
2 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
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such claims or what remedies they should provide. Second, this uncertainty
might encourage property owners to bring tenuous takings claims on the off
chance that the Supreme Court will resolve the issue in their favor.3 Third,
absent a clearly defined test to which they can refer, state judges cannot know
when or to what extent they can modify state property law without effecting a
judicial taking of private property. This ambiguity may impair state judges'
ability to resolve state property law issues.
This Note proposes a test that courts could apply to judicial takings cases. It
attempts to reconcile the competing positions in STBR and suggests a two-
pronged approach with corresponding remedies. Before describing the proposed
test, though, this Note addresses background information crucial to
understanding STBR, including a brief overview of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence and a description of prior Supreme Court decisions pertinent to
the judicial takings issue. It then summarizes the Court's decision in STBR,
focusing in particular on the competing opinions of Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. Next, it critiques four scholars' suggested approaches to judicial
takings. Finally, this Note suggests a two-pronged approach to judicial takings
and concludes with a brief example illustrating how this proposed test would
apply to a well-known case.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A brief overview of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence will help
place judicial takings in the broader context of takings law in general. The most
important text for all takings questions is the Fifth Amendment, which demands
that "private property [not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 4 Significantly, the Constitution does not prohibit the
government from taking private property; rather, it requires that when the
government takes private property it pay compensation.5 The primary reason for
the Takings Clause, according to the Supreme Court, is to prevent
"[g]ovemment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."6
Most Fifth Amendment cases involve the question of what constitutes a
taking. 7 The Supreme Court has identified two main types of takings: (1)
3 Since deciding STBR in 2010, the Court has received at least four petitions for
certiorari involving the judicial takings issue. See Ian Fein, Note, Why Judicial Takings Are
Unripe, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749, 752 n. 10 (2011) (citing denials of petitions for certiorari).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power").6 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
7 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 641 (3d ed.
2006).
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confiscations or physical invasions of property and (2) regulatory takings. 8
Confiscations and physical invasions are fairly straightforward. 9 The second
category of takings, regulatory takings, is somewhat more complicated. In the
famous Pennsylvania Coal case, Justice Holmes observed that governments
would go bankrupt if they were required to reimburse property owners for every
regulation that affected their properties' value.'0 Nonetheless, the Court
recognized that some regulations diminish property values to such an extent that
they essentially confiscate the property." The standard, according to Justice
Holmes, is that a regulation of private property is a taking when it "goes too
far.' 1 2 The Court has wrestled with how to determine when exactly a regulation
"goes too far" for almost a century. 13 Justice Holmes emphasized that the test
was one of fact.14 Later cases reinforced the ad hoc nature of the test.15
In addition to the ad hoc test, the Supreme Court has identified two
categories of regulations that are per se takings. First, a regulation that requires
a property owner to submit to a physical invasion of private property, no matter
how small, is a taking. 16 Second, a regulation that deprives a property owner of
"all economically beneficial uses" of his property is a taking. 17
8 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
9 When the federal government "possessed and operated" a coal mine as part of its
effort to prevent a national coal-miners' strike, the Court easily found that such a
confiscation had taken the coal mine for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See United
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951). When the government occupied a
warehouse leased to General Motors, the Court held such a physical invasion to be a Fifth
Amendment taking. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374-78 (1945).
10Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
11Id.
121d. at 415.
13 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 646.
14pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
15See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (observing
that "we have eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a 'taking'
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into
the circumstances of each particular case"). The Court has identified several factors relevant
to determining whether a regulation goes so far as to effect a taking. See Pa. Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). When analyzing a regulatory takings
question, the Court will examine "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations." Id. The Court will also inquire into the "character of the governmental
action." Id. It will more likely find a taking when the regulation looks like a "physical
invasion by government" than when the regulation is just a "public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id.
16 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). Under
this rule, a state law that required apartment building owners to allow a cable television
company to install cable facilities on their buildings was a taking. Id. at 438.
17 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). In Lucas, the Court
faced the question of whether a South Carolina law that prevented the plaintiff from building
a residence on his beachfront property was a taking. Id. at 1006-07. Since the law rendered
the plaintiff's property valueless, id. at 1020, the Court held that the regulation was a taking
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The two main categories of takings the Supreme Court has identified-
confiscations or physical invasions and regulatory takings-all involve actions
by the legislative or executive branches of government. Prior to 2010, the
Supreme Court had not, in a majority opinion, directly engaged the issue of
whether the judicial branch could accomplish a Fifth Amendment taking. 18 In a
few cases, though, the Court addressed the question in dicta or in a minority
opinion. The next Part discusses those cases.
III. JUDICIAL TAKINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE STBR
Before STBR, the Supreme Court's position on a judicial takings doctrine
was ambiguous. Dicta in two early cases, both decided around the turn of the
twentieth century, appeared to support the doctrine. Three subsequent cases,
though, appeared to oppose it. Then a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart
revived the doctrine. Finally, in the last two decades of the twentieth century,
the doctrine received support from dicta in two majority opinions and in a
dissent from a denial of certiorari authored by Justice Scalia.
A. Two Early Cases Supporting a Judicial Takings Doctrine
In two cases, decided in 1897 and 1905, the Supreme Court appeared to
support a judicial takings doctrine. In neither case did the Court address the
judicial takings issue directly. Nonetheless, dicta in the two opinions seemed to
support applying the Takings Clause to the judiciary.
The first case was Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicago.19 The biggest issue facing the Court was whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a state to award compensation
when it took private property for public use (i.e., whether the Takings Clause
should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment). 20 The Court answered
the question in the affirmative.21 In doing so, it did not distinguish between
takings performed by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches. According
to the Court: "[T]he prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment refer to all
the instrumentalities of the state,-to its legislative, executive, and judicial
unless the State could point to "background principles of nuisance and property law" that
prohibited the plaintiff from building on his land, id. at 1031-32.
18See D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
903,911 (2011).
19 166 U.S. 226 (1897). In 1880, the Chicago City Council enacted an ordinance that
condemned part of a right-of-way belonging to the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Company for use as a city street. Id. at 230. Under Illinois law, a jury was required to award
just compensation for the condemnation. Id. at 229. The jury awarded the impressive sum of
$1. Id. at 230. The railroad, understandably unsatisfied with that amount, appealed.2 0 1d. at 235.
2 1 Id. at 241. This was the first case to incorporate a provision of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 640 & n. 1.
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authorities." 22 Admittedly, a legislative body-the Chicago City Council-
performed the taking in the case.23 Nonetheless, the Court's language lent at
least some support to a doctrine of judicial takings. Under Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad, a judicial opinion that redefined property rights in such a
way as to deprive a citizen of property without just compensation appeared to
violate the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth. 24
Eight years later, the Supreme Court again issued an opinion that seemed to
indirectly support a judicial takings doctrine. In Muhlker v. New York & Harlem
Railroad Co.,25 the Court based its holding upon the Contracts Clause. But
according to Professor Barton Thompson, the plurality opinion "strongly
implied that courts could not constitutionally strip owners of their property by
the expediency of overruling prior precedents." 26 Indeed, Justice Holmes in
dissent recognized that the case was really about property rights and that by
applying the Contract Clause the Court contorted the real issue.27 In short,
Muhlker implied that a state court could accomplish a Fifth Amendment taking
by changing state property law.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad and Muhlker seemed to support a
doctrine of judicial takings. But in the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court did
not indicate further support for such a doctrine. 28 Instead, the Court several
times affirmed the ability of state courts to alter property law without
implicating the Fifth Amendment.
B. Three Cases Opposing a Judicial Takings Doctrine
In three notable cases after Muhlker, the Supreme Court indicated that state
courts should be allowed to change state property law without interference. In
22 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 233.
2 3 See id. at 230.
24 See id. at 233-34; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1449, 1463 (1990); Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process,
Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 379,426.
25 197 U.S. 544 (1905). This case, like Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,
involved a railroad. A New York statute had instructed the railroad to elevate its railway
running along Park Avenue. Id. at 545-46. A property owner, one Henry Muhlker, sued to
enjoin the railroad from building an elevated railway in front of his building unless it
compensated him for his "easements of light, air, and access." See id. at 544-45. Muhlker's
case seemed sound. In a series of earlier cases-the Elevated Railway Cases-the New York
Court of Appeals had held that owners of property along a public street held easements of
light, air, and access and must be compensated when elevated railways disturbed those
easements. See id. at 564-68. Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished the
Elevated Railroad Cases and ruled against Muhlker. See id. at 561.26 See Thompson, supra note 24, at 1464.
27 See Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 575 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("What the plaintiff claims is
really property, a right in rem. It is called contract merely to bring it within the contract
clause of the Constitution.").2 8See Thompson, supra note 24, at 1465.
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Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, the Court, in declining to exercise jurisdiction, stated
that "[t]he mere reversal by a state court of its previous decision, as in this case
before us, whatever its effect upon contracts, does not ... violate any clause of
the federal Constitution." 29
A few years later, in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,30 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the position it had taken in Tidal Oil. Although it
ruled in favor of the property owner on due process grounds,31 the Court
emphasized that state courts were free to change the common law as they saw
fit.32 In a significant passage, the Court stated that "[t]he process of trial and
error, of change of decision in order to conform with changing ideas and
conditions, is traditional with courts administering the common law."'33 The
Court went on to explain that "[s]tate courts ... may ordinarily overrule their
own decisions without offending constitutional guaranties, even though parties
may have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier decisions. '34 Such
language seemed to leave little room for a judicial takings doctrine.
Finally, in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 35
the Supreme Court further entrenched its position that it would not find a taking
when a state court changed state property law. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Cardozo stated that a state court was free to overrule an earlier decision
retroactively. 36 A state court "may hold to the ancient dogma that the law
declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of
29 263 U.S. 444, 455 (1924). The defendant, Tidal Oil, received title to eighty acres of
land from its fourteen-year-old Native American owner, Robert Marshall. Id. at 448. An
Oklahoma district court had previously granted majority rights to Marshall (he was
married!), and the same district court upheld the validity of the transfer to Tidal Oil when
challenged by Marshall's guardian. Id. Later, after Marshall attained the age of majority, he
deeded the land to the plaintiff, Flanagan. Id. Flanagan sued Tidal Oil to quiet title to the
land, the district court ruled in his favor, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed because
Marshall had been a minor when he deeded the land to Tidal Oil. Id. at 449. Tidal Oil
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that it had been deprived of its land without
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
30281 U.S. 673 (1930). The Missouri Supreme Court had held that the state tax
commission did not have the power to grant relief from a discriminatory tax assessment. Id
at 675-76. In accordance with that earlier case, the appellant sued in a Missouri court to
recover taxes it alleged were discriminatory. Id. at 674. But in Brinkerhoff-Faris, the Court
reversed its earlier opinion and declared that the proper manner of challenging a
discriminatory tax assessment was by filing a complaint with the tax commission. Id. at 675-
76. By that time the deadline for filing a complaint had passed, so the appellant was left
without an avenue for obtaining a remedy. Id. at 677.
31 See id. at 678.
32 See id. at 682.
33 1d. at 681 n.8.
341d.
35287 U.S. 358 (1932). In Great Northern Railway, the Supreme Court of Montana had
overruled an earlier decision in which it had held that the railroad commission could
retroactively adjust freight charges. Id. at 359-61.36Id. at 365-66.
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declaration, in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it
had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning." 37
According to Justice Cardozo, a state court's decision to overrule itself either
prospectively or retroactively "may be determined by the juristic philosophy of
the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. '38
In these three cases-Tidal Oil, Brinkerhoff-Faris, and Great Northern
Railway---the Supreme Court indicated that it would not find a judicial taking
when a state court redefined property rights. To the contrary, the Court declared
that state courts were free to change the common law as they saw fit. "Thus,"
according to one prominent author, "by the end of the New Deal, the concept of
judicial takings seemed dead." 39
C. Justice Stewart's Concurring Opinion in Hughes v. Washington
In 1967, the judicial takings concept received a boost from a concurring
opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart in Hughes v. Washington.40 Justice
Stewart proposed that a judicial taking be found when a state court suddenly
and unpredictably changed state property law.41 His suggested approach is
worth quoting at length:
To the extent that [a state court decision] arguably conforms to reasonable
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that it
constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents, no such deference would be appropriate. For a State cannot be
permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property
37 1d. at 365.
38 1d.
39 Thompson, supra note 24, at 1467; cf Barros, supra note 18, at 910-11 (arguing that
these cases should not be seen as opposing a judicial takings doctrine because they involved
private-private transfers, not private-public transfers).
40389 U.S. 290 (1967). A littoral landowner, Stella Hughes, argued that all accretions
(land gained through gradual sediment deposits along the shore) belonged to her. Id. at 290-
91. Such was the rule under federal law. Id. at 291, 293. But according to the Washington
Supreme Court, Washington's state constitution established a rule that all accretions
belonged to the state. Id. at 291. The Supreme Court's majority opinion framed the issue as
whether federal or state law should control. Id. The majority held that federal law controlled
because Mrs. Hughes had derived her title from a federal grant. Id. at 291-93. The accretions
therefore belonged to Mrs. Hughes. Id. at 291. Justice Stewart concurred with the majority,
but he would have approached the case differently. Id. at 294-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
He contended that because property law is a matter of state law, Washington law governed
Mrs. Hughes's right to accretions, regardless of whether she could trace her title to a grant
from the United States. Id. at 295. But Justice Stewart suggested that Mrs. Hughes could
prevail under another theory, that of a judicial taking. See id. at 298.
4 1See id. at 296-97.
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without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that
the property it has taken never existed at all.
42
Whether Justice Stewart was grounding his analysis on the Takings Clause
or on the Due Process Clause is somewhat unclear. Some of his language
pointed to Takings Clause considerations, 43 and some of his language suggested
Due Process considerations. 44
Significantly, Justice Stewart declared that two considerations were
irrelevant to his test: whether the state actor viewed its decision as a taking and
whether a legislature or a court performed the taking. 45 Under Justice Stewart's
analysis, a state court decision that unpredictably changed state property law in
such a way as to deprive a citizen of his or her property was just as much a
taking as was an exercise of eminent domain by a state legislature.
46
A federal district court has twice used Justice Stewart's unpredictability
test.47 The Supreme Court, however, never adopted it. After Hughes, the
Supreme Court's position on judicial takings remained unclear.
D. Judicial Takings After Hughes
In 1980, the Supreme Court confronted a prime opportunity for applying
Justice Stewart's unpredictability test. Six years earlier, the California Supreme
Court had held that the owner of a private shopping center could exclude certain
42 Id. at 296-97 (emphasis added).
43 See id at 296 (reasoning that "if it cannot reasonably be said that the littoral rights of
upland owners were terminated in 1889, then the effect of the decision now before us is to
take from these owners, without compensation, land deposited by the Pacific Ocean from
1889 to 1966").
44 See id. at 296 (arguing that the Court should not defer to a state court decision "to the
extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents"); see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 253 (2011), http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/946.pdf
(contending that Stewart's opinion "arguably" supports applying the Due Process Clause to a
judicial takings claim, but conceding that "it is not entirely clear whether Justice Stewart was
relying upon due process canons, takings canons, or some hybrid of the two").45 See Hughes, 389 U.S. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46 See id. (noting that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
such confiscation by. a state, no less through its courts than through its legislature, and no
less when a taking is unintended than when it is deliberate"). Applying his test to the facts of
the case, Justice Stewart observed that the Washington state constitution did not
unambiguously state that all accretions belonged to the state. Id at 296. He cited an earlier
case in which the Washington Supreme Court had interpreted the constitution to mean that
littoral landowners received title to accretions. Id. at 297. According to Justice Stewart, by
rejecting its earlier decision and reinterpreting the state constitution, the Washington
Supreme Court "effected an unforeseeable change in Washington property law." Id. Since it
did not compensate Mrs. Hughes for the loss of her land, the court took Mrs. Hughes's
property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 298.47 See infra Part IV.
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types of speech from his premises.48 In 1979, the court reversed itself, holding
that the owner of the Pruneyard Shopping Center could not exclude high school
students soliciting support for a political cause.49 The case seemed perfect for a
judicial takings claim. Using Justice Stewart's test, the property owner could
have argued that the California Supreme Court had taken from him a property
right-his right to exclude-that had been established by the previous case. The
California Supreme Court's decision certainly seemed to be "a sudden change
in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents. ' 50 If the property
owner could have convinced the Supreme Court to adopt Justice Stewart's test,
he should have won. But the owner did not frame his argument in terms of a
judicial taking.51
The Supreme Court's majority opinion also did not address the judicial
takings issue. The Court treated the case like a normal regulatory takings case,
with the taking effected by the California Constitution.52 The Court held that the
regulation did not go far enough to constitute a taking because the shopping
center owner's loss of his right to exclude did not "unreasonably impair the
value or use" of his property. 53
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,54 decided the same year
as Pruneyard, the Supreme Court employed language that seemed to support a
judicial takings doctrine. Under Florida law, as construed by the Florida
Supreme Court, county circuit court clerks were required to deposit interpleader
funds into interest-bearing accounts. 55 The interest accruing on those funds
belonged to the county.56 The receiver for the creditors of Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies challenged the law as a taking of private property, but the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the law. It held that no taking had occurred because an
interpleader fund is public money while it is deposited with the court. 57
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.58 It held, in a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Blackmun, that an interpleader fund is private property.59
4 8 See Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460, 463 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974).4 9 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1980).
50 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51 Brief of Appellants at 9-10, Pruneyard, 447 U.S. 74 (No. 79-289) Rather, the owner
argued that his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
should trump the California statutory right of access.52 See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82-83.
53 See id. at 83.
54449 U.S. 155 (1980).
55 Seeid. at 155-56, 160.
56 Seeid. at 160.
57 Seeid. at 158-59.
58 Seeid. at 155.
59 See id. at 161.
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The statute took private property by treating it like public property.60 Although
a statute accomplished the taking in Webb 's, Justice Blackmun indicated that a
taking would also occur if a court decision converted private property into
public property. 61 He wrote, "Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the
Florida courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks
simply by recharacterizing the principal as 'public money' because it is held
temporarily by the court."'62 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, therefore, appeared
to support a judicial takings doctrine. 63
Justice Scalia was the first justice after Justice Stewart to advocate in favor
of a judicial takings doctrine. He expressed his views on the topic in his dissent
from a denial of certiorari in the case Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.64
Stevens arose out of the Oregon Supreme Court's famous use of the doctrine of
custom in Thornton v. Hay.6 5 In Thornton, an opinion that has been described as
exhibiting "an extraordinary streak of judicial activism," 66 the Oregon Supreme
Court held that under the doctrine of custom, the entire dry-sand area of the
Oregon coastline was open to public recreational use.67 When the plaintiffs in
Stevens were prevented from building a seawall on their beach because it would
interfere with the public's access, they appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming
their property had been taken without just compensation. 68
Justice Scalia was clearly uncomfortable with the way the Oregon courts
had used the doctrine of custom in Thornton and with how they had applied
Thornton to the Stevens case. He affirmed the basic principle that property law
is the province of the individual states, but he worried that a state court might
manipulate property law in a manner that violated the Constitution.69 He did not
want his "background principles" discussion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council to become a tool that state courts could use to take property without
compensation. 70 He wrote, "No more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat
6 0 See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164 (explaining that "a State, by ipse
dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation, even
for the limited duration of the deposit in court").
6 1 See id.6 21d. (emphasis added).
63Justice Scalia cited it for this very purpose in STBR. See Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
64 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice
O'Connor was the only other justice to join Justice Scalia's dissent.
65 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
66 David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375, 1417 (1996).67 See Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676.
68 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
69 See id. at 1210-11.
70 See id.; see also discussion supra note 17.
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may a State transform private property into public property without
compensation." 71
Stevens was the last significant instance in which a member of the Court
directly addressed the judicial takings issue for approximately sixteen years.
The interlude was not due to a lack of available cases. During that time, the
Court denied certiorari on the issue fifteen times.72 Not until 2010 did the Court
finally agree to hear a judicial takings case. Before turning to that case, though,
it is instructive to briefly observe how one lower federal court dealt with a
judicial takings claim.
IV. A DISTRICT COURT'S APPROACH TO JUDICIAL TAKINGS
In two noteworthy instances, a district court has grappled with the judicial
takings issue. In these cases, both decided by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii, the court applied Justice Stewart's unpredictability test from
Hughes to find that a judicial taking had occurred. The cases were decided
almost identically, so describing the first will suffice to describe both.
Robinson v. Ariyoshi73 arose out of a dispute between the State of Hawaii
and several private parties over water rights along the Hanapepe River.74 The
71 Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Justice Scalia also reasoned that,
just as a State may not deny rights protected under the Federal Constitution through
pretextual procedural rulings .... neither may it do so by invoking nonexistent rules of
state substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas, for example, would be a nullity if anything
that a state court chooses to denominate "background law"-regardless of whether it is
really such-could eliminate property rights.
Id. at 1211. Justice Scalia opined that if the Oregon courts' use of the doctrine of custom was
indeed pretextual-as he suspected it was-then the courts had taken the plaintiff's property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 1212. Although Justice Scalia thought the
"case rais[ed] a serious Fifth Amendment Takings issue," he believed the factual record was
too scanty for the Court to consider the issue. Id. at 1212-13. But he thought the Court
should hear the petitioner's due process claim. Id. at 1213. He never addressed the question
of whether the judicial branch can actually take property in a constitutional sense. Evidently
to him the taking was more important than the taker. He would later state this position
explicitly in Stop the Beach Renourishment. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
72 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
73441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in part and vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the parts of the
district court's decision relating to the takings question. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d
1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1985). But the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion
and remanded for further consideration in light of Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). See Ariyoshi v.
Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986). The Ninth Circuit eventually concluded that the case was
not ripe and dismissed the suit. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1989).
For sources discussing the impact of the Williamson County exhaustion doctrine on judicial
takings claims, see infra note 249.
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Hawaii Supreme Court, instead of resolving the claims argued on appeal, sua
sponte decided that all the water in the river-and indeed all flowing water in
the entire state-belonged to the State. 75 In so doing, according to the district
court, the Hawaii Supreme Court overturned more than one hundred years of
settled Hawaiian law.76 Although it granted the private parties' request for a
rehearing, the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to address their constitutional
claim. 77 The private parties then filed suit in the district court, claiming that the
Hawaii Supreme Court violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them
of property without either procedural or substantive due process. 78
The district court first addressed the procedural due process claim. 79 It held
that the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were violated because "the
effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court was to deprive the plaintiffs of
their property... without affording any of them an opportunity to be heard in
their defense." 80
The court also declared that the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights
had been violated because the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision took their
property without providing compensation. 81 The court applied Justice Stewart's
unpredictability test and found that the Hawaii Supreme Court "effected an
unforeseeable change in Hawaii's water rights laws." 82 That the Hawaii
Supreme Court did not view its decision as a taking was, according to the
district court, irrelevant. 83 Because the Hawaii Supreme Court unpredictably
changed the state's property law in such a way as to deprive its citizens of their
74 Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. at 561-62.
75 d. According to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the state's ownership was subject to
appurtenant riparian rights in keeping with English common law. Id Before the court's
decision, Hawaii law treated water rights as severable from land appurtenant to the river;
owners of land appurtenant to a river could use the water to irrigate more than just the
appurtenant property. Id. at 581-82.
76 1d. at 585.
77 d. at 564. The court limited the rehearing to two limited, non-constitutional issues.
Id. The District Court described the rehearing as "almost farcical." Id. at 580.
78 Id. at 580.791d.
8 0Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. at 580 (stating that "[o]n this basis alone the judgment of the
court would have to be declared void, for if permitted to remain in full force and effect,
plaintiffs have been deprived of property rights without ever having had a fair and
meaningful opportunity to defend against their being handed over to the State on a silver
platter without even a request by the State for the gift").8 11d. at 584-86.
82 d. at 585 ("[T]he decision made an unsolicited and unexpected gift to the State of all
of the waters in all of the streams and to the complete surprise of all parties, said that the
State had always owned the waters. There was no precedent for this determination."
(emphasis omitted)).
83 Id. (stating that "[t]he Constitution does not measure the taking of property by what a
court may say or even what it may intend; the measure is by the result").
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water rights without compensation, the Fourteenth Amendment required that the
court's decision be declared void. 84
V. STOP THE BEACH RENOUPSHMENT
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (STBR), 85 the U.S. Supreme Court heard for the first
time a direct judicial takings claim. Six justices agreed that the Constitution
limits the ability of state courts to redefine property rights, and the remaining
two justices did not necessarily disagree.8 6 Nonetheless, the Court fractured
over what constitutional provision it should apply. Four justices agreed that the
Takings Clause should apply; two justices indicated they would rather use the
Due Process Clause; and the remaining two justices wanted to leave the issue
for another day.
A. Facts of the Case and the State Court Decisions
In 1995, Hurricane Opal drastically eroded portions of the Florida shoreline
along the Gulf of Mexico.87 In response, the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) began a project to renourish the beaches by
dredging sand and dumping it along the shoreline.88 Stop the Beach
Renourishment (STBR), a non-profit corporation comprised of six beachfront
property owners, attempted to halt the project.89 When it failed to stop the
project through an administrative hearing, STBR filed suit in the Florida
District Court of Appeal.90
STBR challenged the renourishment project as an unconstitutional taking of
riparian rights.91 Under Florida property law, the boundary along the coast
between private land (on the landward side) and public land (on the seaward
841d. at 586. The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii took a similar approach
the next year in Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978). In that
case, the plaintiffs challenged a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court that sua sponte
changed the seaward boundary of littoral land from the seaweed line to the vegetation line.
See id. at 475-76. Unlike Ariyoshi, Sotomura was not challenged on ripeness grounds or
even appealed at all.
85 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
86Justice Stevens recused himself from the case, probably because he owns an
apartment near the beach in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Adam Liptak, Justices Debate Issues
in an Oceanfront Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A15.87 Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006)88Id.
89 d. at 51, 55.
9 0 See id. at 50-51.
91 See id. at 56. Under Florida law, "[r]iparian rights are property rights that cannot be
constitutionally taken without just compensation." Id.
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side) is the mean high water line (MHWL).92 Because the high water line can
shift over time, the seaward boundary of littoral land under Florida common law
is a "dynamic boundary" which can increase or decrease the size of a littoral
landowner's property.93 But after a beach restoration project conducted under
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act,94 the dynamic MHWL boundary is
replaced with a fixed boundary, the Erosion Control Line (ECL).95 With the
ECL as the boundary, a littoral landowner's property can no longer grow and
shrink due to accretion and erosion as it once could under the common law
rule.96 When the State renourishes the beach by dumping sand along the
shoreline, the new beach area belongs to the State. 97 STBR contended that
under Florida law its members' riparian rights included the right of access to the
water (which included the right to have littoral property contact the water) and
the right to receive accretions. 98 By fixing the boundary as the ECL and
extending the beach past that line, the renourishment project took those rights
without providing compensation. STBR's arguments prevailed in the Florida
District Court of Appeal. 99
The Florida Supreme Court disagreed. 100 It criticized the lower court for
failing to apply the doctrine of avulsion, under which a sudden change to the
92Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla.
2008). "[T]he State holds the lands seaward of the MHWL, including the beaches between
the mean high and low water lines, in trust for the public for the purposes of bathing, fishing,
and navigation." Id. at 1109. Since the high water line can shift over time due to erosion or
accretion, the MHWL is calculated using a nineteen-year average. Id. at 1113, 1119.93 Seeid. at 1112.
94 FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-.45 (2005). Under its constitution, the State of Florida has a
duty to "conserve and protect" its shoreline. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1110-11 (citing
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a)). In accordance with that duty, the state legislature in 1961
enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act. See FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-.45. The Act
gives the Florida Department of Environmental Protection the responsibility to identify
beaches that need restoration and the authority to fund the restoration project. id.
§ 161.101(1).
95 Id. § 161.191(1). The Act clarified that
there is no intention on the part of the state to extend its claims to lands not already held
by it or to deprive any upland or submerged land owner of the legitimate and
constitutional use and enjoyment of his or her property. If an authorized beach
restoration, beach nourishment, and erosion control project cannot reasonably be
accomplished without the taking of private property, the taking must be made by the
requesting authority by eminent domain proceedings.
Id. § 161.141.
96 Id. § 161.191(2).
97 See id.
98 Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 57 (Fla Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
9 9 See id. at 58.
100 See generally Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008).
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shoreline does not alter the seaward boundary of littoral land.' 0 1 It also held that
there was no possessory right to accretions under Florida law, 102 and that "there
[was] no independent littoral right of contact with the water under Florida
common law."'1 3 In the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, therefore, the
beach renourishment project did not take any property rights from the members
of STBR.
B. The Parties 'Arguments
STBR appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari in 2009.104 In its brief, STBR changed its
strategy from what it had argued before the Florida courts. In the two Florida
cases, it had contended that the DEP-part of the executive branch-was
attempting to unconstitutionally take its members' property. Before the
Supreme Court it presented an explicit judicial takings argument. '0 5
101 See id at 1114. Under Florida property law, as under the common law, there is a
distinction between "gradual and imperceptible" changes to the shoreline and changes that
occur suddenly. See id. at 1113. Gradual additions and losses are termed accretions and
erosions, respectively. 1d. Sudden additions and losses are called avulsions. Id. Only
accretions and erosions change the seaward boundary of littoral land. Id. at 1113-14. If the
shoreline increases or decreases by avulsion, the boundary remains the same as it was before
the avulsion occurred. Id. at 1113-14. The Florida Supreme Court explained that Hurricane
Opal, which suddenly decreased the size of the beach, was an avulsive event. See id. at 1116.
The boundary after the hurricane thus remained the MHWL as it was before the hurricane.
See id. Florida case law establishes the right of littoral landowners to reclaim land that is
submerged through an avulsion. See id. at 1116-17. "Consequently," the court concluded,
"if the shoreline is lost due to an avulsive event, the public has the right to restore its
shoreline up to that MHWL." Id. at 1117. The court's reasoning seems slightly illogical.
Littoral owners can reclaim previously dry land after it has been submerged by an avulsion.
But since the state's land was submerged to begin with, it seems strange that the state should
be able to create dry land that it never lost in the first place. STBR argued this very point
before the Supreme Court. See Brief of Petitioner at 34, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
102 See Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1116. According to the court, the right to accretions
is a contingent future interest. Id. at 1112. It "only becomes a possessory interest if and when
land is added to the upland by accretion." Id. The right to accretion thus does not apply after
the ECL is set as the property boundary. See id. at 1117-19.
103Id. at 1116. The court interpreted Florida law to mean that the right of "contact is
ancillary to the littoral right of access to the water... [and] exists to preserve the upland
owner's core littoral right of access to the water." Id. at 1119. Since the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act "expressly protects the right of access to the water, which is the sole
justification for the subsidiary right of contact," id. at 1119, "the Act, on its face, does not
unconstitutionally eliminate the ancillary right to contact," id. at 1120.104 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 101, at 2.
10 5 See id. at 15. In addition to its judicial takings argument, STBR argued a more
traditional takings claim: that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act physically took its
members' property. See id. at 51-58. It predicted, in a rather far-fetched portion of its
argument, that all sorts of commercial activities, including kayak rentals, climbing walls, and
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Essentially, STBR advocated that the Supreme Court hold the Florida
Supreme Court's decision to be a judicial taking under the unpredictability test
espoused by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes.'0 6 Quoting Justice
Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens, STBR asserted that the
Florida Supreme Court "invoked 'nonexistent rules of state substantive law'
when holding that no taking had occurred. 107 It contended that before the
Florida Supreme Court's decision, settled Florida law gave its members the
right to future accretions and the right to have their property contact the
water. 108 The Florida Supreme Court "sidestep[ped] this background law." 109
STBR realized that even if the Supreme Court accepted its argument that the
Florida Supreme Court had changed state property law, it could not win unless
the Supreme Court recognized a doctrine of judicial takings. Therefore, it
dedicated a significant portion of its brief to advocate a doctrine of judicial
takings and promote Justice Stewart's unpredictability test in Hughes.I
1 0
In its reply brief, the DEP asserted that even if the Supreme Court decided
to adopt a judicial takings doctrine, it should not find such a taking in the case at
hand.Il The DEP contended that if the Supreme Court chose to adopt a judicial
takings doctrine, that doctrine should be extremely narrow.1 12 According to the
DEP, to find a judicial taking, the reviewing court must find the lower court
decision to be much more than merely unpredictable. The lower court must
have "abused [its] judicial authority" in "an egregious way." 113 Its decision
must have been "plainly a wholly unprincipled and pretextual departure from
obvious and well-established legal principles" before a judicial taking could
parasailing, would occur on the public portion of the renourished beach. See id. at 55. It also
argued that its procedural due process rights had been violated because the beach
renourishment process did not afford it a "meaningful opportunity to be heard." See id. at 60,
59-66.
106See id. at 20. ("STBR respectfully requests that this Court expressly recognize the
doctrine of judicial takings and adopt the judicial takings test articulated by Justice Stewart
in his concurring opinion in Hughes." (citation omitted)).
107M. at 21-22 (quoting Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1992)
(mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
108 Id. at 22-23.
109Id. at 26.
110 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 101, at 34-50. In STBR's own words: "[T]his
Court [should] hold that a state court-decision which suddenly and dramatically changes
what constitutes property under state property law, in a manner that is unpredictable in terms
of relevant precedents, is a taking of property subject to the Fifth Amendment's
compensation requirements." Id. at 50.
111 See Brief of Respondents at 37-38, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592
(No. 08-1151).
1 1 2 See id. at38.
113 1d. at 58.
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occur.
1 14 According to the DEP, the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in STBR
was not such a decision. 115
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously held for the DEP,116 determining that the
Florida Supreme Court had not taken any property from the members of
STBR.11 7 But although the Court's holding was unanimous, its reasoning was
not. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by three other
justices, sought to establish a judicial takings doctrine based upon a test asking
whether established property rights had been taken.'1 8 Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justice Sotomayor, thought that the Court should employ the Due Process
Clause to protect against judicial takings.' 19 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, thought that the Court should save the issue of a judicial takings
doctrine for a later case. 120
1. The Court's Holding
The Court's unanimous holding, authored by Justice Scalia, concluded that
no taking had occurred.' 21 As the Court framed the issue, to prevail STBR
needed to show that its "rights to future accretions and contact with the water
[were] superior to the State's right to fill in its submerged land." 122 The Court
first observed that in the case of an avulsion that increases the size of the beach,
the State owns the newly exposed section of the beach. 123 So, queried the Court,
should that result change if the State caused the avulsion (e.g., by dumping sand
along the shoreline)? 24 As the Court interpreted Florida law, the answer was
"no," and therefore the State's right to fill was superior to the littoral right to
14 Id
15 Id. Far from effecting a sudden and unpredictable change in Florida property law,
argued the DEP, the Florida Supreme Court "merely validat[ed] an established statutory
framework by use of reasoning and analysis that [was] fully supportable." Id. at 38. The
Department cautioned against implementing a judicial takings doctrine that would require
federal courts to meddle in state property law. See id. at 58 (warning that "[f]ederal courts
should not involve themselves in and second-guess the evolution of state common law,
which can vary widely from state to state").
116 Eight justices joined the holding. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2597.
117 See id. at 2613.
118 See id at 2602 (plurality opinion).119 See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120 See id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
12 1See id. at 2597, 2613 (majority opinion). The Court's unanimous holding is
contained in Parts I, IV, and V of his opinion.
122 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
12 3 See id.
12 4 See id.
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accretion.125 The Court recognized that a legal scheme which allows a state to
create public beaches simply by dumping sand along private beaches might not
be ideal from a public policy standpoint. 126 Nonetheless, "[t]he Takings Clause
only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they
might have been established or ought to have been established."' 127 Finally, the
Court addressed STBR's professed right to have its land contact the water. 128 It
concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's analysis of that supposed right was
correct in light of prior Florida precedent. 1
29
Because the Supreme Court determined that Florida's right to renourish its
beaches was superior to STBR's littoral property rights, it affirmed the decision
of the Florida Supreme Court. 130 The Court concluded that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision had not taken any property rights from STBR.
13 1
2. Justice Breyer's Opinion
Justices Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that no property rights
had been taken and would have ended the analysis at that. 132 He worried that
Justice Scalia's attempt to articulate a test for judicial takings would open a
Pandora's box of takings issues that was better off left shut. 133 Specifically, he
worried that thousands of judicial takings cases, many involving difficult areas
of state property law, would flood the Court. 134 He also wished to avoid the
possibility of federal judges meddling in the evolution of state. property law.135
Since there was no taking by the Florida Supreme Court, Justice Breyer thought
the Court should "'confine [itself] to deciding only what is necessary to the
disposition of the immediate case. " 136
12 5 See id.
126See id. at 2612.127 Id.
128 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
129See id. at 2612-13 (finding that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court decision before us is
consistent with these background principles of state property law").
130 See id. at 2613.
131 See id. at 2612 (holding that "[w]e cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida law").
132 See id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133 See id. at 2618-19.
134 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); cf. Thompson, supra note 24, at 1512 (arguing that "[t]he
sheer financial burden of petitioning the Supreme Court is likely to provide a significant
incentive against bringing a large number of groundless challenges" and that "[c]oncem over
workload, moreover, need not call for the disavowal of a judicial takings doctrine, but
merely the enunciation of relatively clear and high standards for prevailing on a judicial
takings claim").
135 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
1361d. (quoting Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 373 (1955)). He
observed that "courts frequently find it possible to resolve cases-even those raising
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3. Justice Kennedy's Opinion
To a certain extent, Justice Kennedy's opinion-which Justice Sotomayor
joined-reached the same conclusion as Justice Breyer's. That is, Justice
Kennedy believed that the Court should go no further than to decide that no
property rights had been taken, saving the judicial takings issue for another
day. 137 Justice Kennedy's self-professed reason for writing his separate opinion
was to "note[] certain difficulties that should be considered" before the Court
adopted Justice Scalia's judicial takings test.138 But the most salient part of his
opinion is his argument that reviewing courts should use the Due Process
Clause, not the Takings Clause, to prevent lower courts from taking private
property. 139
Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court could use the Due Process Clause
to "limit[] the power of courts to eliminate or change established property
rights."' 140 He proposed that a judicial decision that takes property "be set aside
as a deprivation of property without due process of law.' 14 1 Both the procedural
and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause could apply to a judicial
taking. 142 In Justice Kennedy's words: "The Court would be on strong footing
in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes
established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is
constitutional questions-without specifying the precise standard under which a party wins
or loses." Id.; see also Barros, supra note 18, at 915 (arguing that "Justices Breyer and
Kennedy have the better of this argument").137 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).138 See id. at 2613. Kennedy identified four principal difficulties with adopting a judicial
takings doctrine. First, Kennedy believed that a judicial takings doctrine would "implicitly
recognize" state courts' power to take property as long as compensation is provided, a power
that he was not sure they possessed. See id. at 2614. He worried that a judicial takings
doctrine would give more, not less, takings power to state courts. See id. at 2616. Second,
Kennedy considered the method by which judicial takings claims should be raised to be
unclear. See id. If a state supreme court changes property law, should the property owner
petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (in which case the takings issue
would not have been considered in the court below), or should the property owner bring a
separate lawsuit to argue the judicial takings claim? See id. at 2617. Third, Kennedy thought
that applying the Takings Clause to judicial actions might be inconsistent with the Framer's
intent. See id. at 2616. Fourth, Kennedy wondered what relief should be provided for a
judicial taking. See id at 2617. Should it be compensation or equitable relief? See id.
Because of these unresolved issues, Kennedy thought the Court should postpone adopting a
judicial takings doctrine until lower courts and commentators had fleshed out the details. See
id. at 2617-18.
139 See id. at 2614.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 Id.
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'arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause."'143 Using the Due
Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause would solve the difficult question
of whether compensation or invalidation should be the proper remedy for a
judicial taking. 144
On the whole, Justice Kennedy's opinion indicates that he was critical of
applying the Takings Clause to the judicial branch and preferred to apply the
procedural and substantive aspects of due process. But Justice Kennedy was not
completely averse to applying the Takings Clause. He conceded that "[i]f and
when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional
principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate
to protect property owners, then the question whether a judicial decision can
effect a taking would be properly presented." 145 Clearly, though, Justice
Kennedy viewed that time as far in the future.
4. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Not surprisingly, given his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens,
Justice Scalia wholeheartedly supported applying the Takings Clause to the
judicial branch. In his plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Alito and Thomas, 146 Justice Scalia outlined the approach he
thought the Court should take.
Justice Scalia found support for a judicial takings doctrine in the text of the
Fifth Amendment. He thought it significant that the Takings Clause is written in
the passive voice. 147 Because the Takings Clause "is not addressed to the action
of a specific branch or branches," "[i]t is concerned simply with the act, and not
with the governmental actor."148 According to its text, then, the Takings Clause
applies to any governmental taking of private property, whether accomplished
by the legislative, executive, or judicial branch. 149 "It would be absurd to allow
a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by
legislative fiat."'150
The second area in which Justice Scalia found support for a judicial takings
doctrine was Supreme Court precedent. He observed that Pruneyard,151
although it did not address the judicial takings issue, never implied that judicial
143 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542
(2005)).
14 4 See id. at 2614.
145 See id. at 2618.
146 See id. at 260 1-10 (plurality opinion).
147 See id. at 2601. The Takings Clause reads: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
148 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion).
14 9 See id.
1501d.
151 For a discussion of Pruneyard, see supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
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takings cannot occur and might be read as implying the opposite. 152 He also
cited Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies'53 as supporting a judicial takings
doctrine. 1 4
Once he had shown that a judicial takings doctrine was grounded both in
the text of the Constitution and in Supreme Court precedent, Justice Scalia
articulated the test that he thought the Court should employ. He rejected both
the test proposed by the DEP and the test proposed by STBR. 155 He interpreted
the DEP's proposed test as similar to the "fair and substantial basis" test used
by the Court when determining whether a state court opinion is supported by
adequate and independent state grounds.156 That test, wrote Justice Scalia, "is
not obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking of
property."'157
Justice Scalia also found the unpredictability test, first proposed by Justice
Stewart and backed by STBR, to be deficient. He argued that Stewart's
unpredictability test was both too broad and too narrow.
A "predictability of change" test would cover both too much and too little. Too
much, because a judicial property decision need not be predictable, so long as
it does not declare that what had been private property under established law
no longer is.... And the predictability test covers too little, because a judicial
elimination of established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta
or even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking. 158
Instead, Justice Scalia proposed a new approach. "If... a court declares
that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it
has taken that property . -"159 Of course, that test begs the question of when a
property right can be considered "established." To determine whether a property
right is established, said Justice Scalia, the Court should look to state law. 160 A
property right is established only if there is no doubt about its existence. 161 If
the existence of a property right is doubtful, the Court should "not make [its]
own assessment but [rather] accept the determination of the state court. 162
152 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (plurality opinion).
153 For a discussion of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, see supra text accompanying
notes 54-63.
154 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
155 See id. at 2608-10.
15 6 See id. at 2608.
157Id
158Id at 2610.
1591d. at 2602 (emphasis omitted); see also John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach
Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. REv. 475, 477 (2010) (describing
Justice Scalia's test as a "per se takings test" analogous to physical invasions and regulations
that deprive the property owner of all economically beneficial uses of the property).
160 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9 (plurality opinion).
161 See id.
162 Id.
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Under Justice Scalia's test, then, a court must evaluate the challenged court
decision in light of state property law. If under state law a private property right
was "established" and if the decision eliminated that property right, the decision
accomplished a taking.
Along with his test, Justice Scalia proposed how the Court should remedy a
judicial taking. According to Justice Scalia, if the Court finds that a judicial
taking occurred, it should invalidate the state court decision that accomplished
the taking. 163 Rather than require the state court to provide compensation, the
Court should invalidate the decision, thus requiring the legislature to acquire the
property by eminent domain if it should choose to do so. 164
Justice Scalia energetically criticized the concurring opinions written by
Justices Breyer and Kennedy. He attacked Justice Breyer's opinion as
illogical. 165 "One cannot know whether a takings claim is invalid without
knowing what standard it has failed to meet." 166
He criticized Justice Kennedy's proposed use of the Due Process Clause on
multiple grounds. 16 7 Essentially, he was suspicious of applying what he viewed
as an extremely amorphous doctrine. 168 "[B]ecause Substantive Due Process is
such a wonderfully malleable concept,.. . even a firm commitment to apply it
would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular."' 169 In Justice Scalia's
163 See id. at 2607 ("If we were to hold that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an
uncompensated taking in the present case, we would simply reverse the Florida Supreme
Court's judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the property
in question.").164 See id.
165 See id. at 2603.
166 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion). Employing
what must be one of the more unusual phrases found in a Supreme Court opinion, Justice
Scalia described Breyer's opinion as "reminiscent of the perplexing question how much
wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?" Id. Professor Barros
contends that in this argument Justice Breyer had the stronger position. See Barros, supra
note 18, at 916 (concluding that since no property was taken, "[u]nder no conceivable
standard.., could the Florida Supreme Court's holding be a judicial taking, and the
Supreme Court of the United States... did not need to reach the specific substantive
standard for judicial takings to reject the petitioner's claims").167 First, Justice Scalia contended that procedural due process should not apply to
prevent state courts from taking property since federal separation-of-powers principles do
not apply to state governments. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2605
(plurality opinion). Second, he condemned the use of substantive due process rather than the
Takings Clause as violating the Court's practice of whenever possible applying an explicit
constitutional provision rather than the vague standard of substantive due process. See id. at
2606. He ridiculed Justice Kennedy's proposed application of substantive due process to
property issues as an attempt to take the Court back to the Lochner Era. See id. To Justice
Kennedy's original intent concern, Justice Scalia replied that the clear text of the Takings
Clause makes the authors' intent irrelevant. See id. Finally, Justice Scalia dismissed Justice
Kennedy's concern that the remedy for a judicial taking must be compensation. See id. at
2607. In his view, invalidation, not compensation, was the appropriate remedy. See id
168 See id. at 2608.
169Id.
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opinion, the Takings Clause provided a more secure bastion for guarding
against judicial takings.
5. STBR's Impact on the Judicial Takings Concept
To recap, in STBR at least six justices 170 agreed that the ability of state
courts to take private property by redefining the law must be limited. Two more
justices 171 thought the issue should be saved for another day, but they did not
explicitly disagree on principle. Therefore, the Court apparently no longer
adheres to its position in cases such as Tidal Oil, Brinkerhoff-Faris, and Great
Northern Railway, which declared that state courts were free to alter property
law as they pleased without violating any constitutional rights. 172
What the Court did not agree on was the standard under which judicial
takings claims should be analyzed. Four justices agreed that the Takings Clause
should apply so that a court takes property when it "declares that what was once
an established right of private property no longer exists." 173 Two justices
suggested that the Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural
aspects, should apply when a state court redefines property law. 174 Under this
approach, "a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes
established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is
'arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause."' 175
The Court also split over the remedy a court should employ when it finds
that a state court decision has taken property. If a court finds that the challenged
court decision violates due process, the remedy seems clear. The decision
should be invalidated. 176 Justice Scalia thought that invalidation should also be
the remedy if a court finds that the challenged court decision violates the
Takings Clause.177 But Justice Kennedy argued that the correct remedy under
the Takings Clause is to order the lower court to provide compensation.178
VI. FIVE SCHOLARS AND THEIR SUGGESTED JUDICIAL TAKINGS TESTS
The scholarly literature addressing the judicial takings issue is somewhat
limited, 179 although it has expanded since STBR. Several scholars, some writing
170 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and Sotomayor.
171 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg.
172 See supra Part III.B.
173 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
174 See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
175 Id. at 2615 (citations omitted).
176 See id. at 2614.
177 See id. at 2607 (plurality opinion).178 See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
179 See W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV.
1487, 1494 (2004) (observing that "[s]cholars... have given this question, most commonly
called the 'judicial takings problem,' sporadic attention").
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before STBR and some writing after, have proposed their own versions of tests
they think courts should apply when deciding a judicial takings claim. Five
authors in particular-Barton Thompson, David Sarratt, Benjamin Barros, and
co-authors Eduardo Pefialver and Lior Strahilevitz-have formulated judicial
takings tests and suggested remedies that courts should invoke when they find a
judicial taking.
A. Barton Thompson 's Approach: Stewart's Unpredictability Test and
Two Innovative Remedies
Professor Barton Thompson's article, Judicial Takings,180 is widely
recognized as the groundbreaking article on judicial takings. 181 His central
thesis was that the takings protections of the Constitution should apply to the
judicial branch as well as to the legislative and executive branches. 182 In
keeping with his thesis, he first assumed that a judicial taking occurs when a
court changes the law in a way that would constitute a taking if done by a
legislature or an executive agency.183 But he recognized that under the positivist
definition of property rights embraced by the Supreme Court, property rights
are whatever a court says they are.184 Under a positivist definition of property
rights, it really cannot ever be said that a court has changed the law in such a
way as to take property.185
Thompson's solution was to suggest that although the Court says it employs
a positivist definition of property law, in reality it has adopted an expectations
approach to property law. 186 Under an expectations approach, a judicial taking
occurs when a court suddenly changes the law in such a way that it would
constitute a taking if done by a legislature or an executive agency.187
In short, to the extent he advocated a test for judicial takings, Thompson
essentially espoused the same unpredictability test as that proposed by Justice
Stewart.' 88 Additionally, he suggested that a reviewing federal court should
180 Thompson, supra note 24.
181 See Sarratt, supra note 179, at 1494 (describing Thompson's article as "seminal").
182See Thompson, supra note 24, at 1542 ("In the Introduction, the question was
whether the courts should be treated any differently under the takings protections than the
legislative and executive branches of our governments. An alternative question could have
been whether the legislative and executive branches should be treated any differently from
the courts.").
183 See id. at 1455.
1 8 4 See id. at 1523.
185 See id. ("Given the indeterminacy of positive law,.., will we ever be able to say
definitively that a court has changed the law?").
186 See id. at 1539 ("[T]here is language in at least some cases suggesting that the Court
is not using a pure positivist approach even in traditional takings cases, but is instead using
an expectations approach.").
187 See id. at 1496-97.
188 See Mulvaney, supra note 44, at 253-55 (recognizing that "Thompson may not have
perfectly accomplished his stated goal of formulating a 'relatively clear and high standard[]
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inquire "whether the state judicial decision was neutral and fully considered its
impact on property holders."'189 In the context of that inquiry, he posited that
"[w]here a change seems to be a natural step in a slow but continuous evolution
in the common law, one feels relatively assured that the change was not
motivated by current political pressures and has been carefully considered."190
Thompson's test suffers from the same ambiguity that impairs Justice
Stewart's test. 191 It fails to make clear whether a judicial takings claim should
be analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. Additionally,
as Justice Scalia pointed out in STBR, a foreseeable change in the law can take
property just as surely as can a nonforeseeable change. The predictability of the
change may ensure that the court decision comports with substantive due
process considerations, but it does not necessarily determine whether a taking
has occurred. Furthermore, one suspects that a property owner who lost a
property right as a result of a "neutral and fully considered" court decision
would find little solace in the Court's impeccable reasoning.
Thompson's discussion of remedies was much more innovative than his
discussion of a judicial takings test. He recognized that one option is to assume
that the Takings Clause prohibits courts from taking property. 192 Under that
assumption, a court decision that takes property would be declared invalid by
the reviewing court. Another approach, though, is to assume that a court
decision can take property so long as the state provides just compensation.
Thompson suggested two remedies a reviewing court could employ when it
finds that a lower court decision effected a taking. 193 First, under the Automatic
Compensation Approach, the reviewing court could require the lower court to
vacate its decision unless the state provided compensation for the taking. 194
Second, under the Legislative Choice Approach, the reviewing court could
declare the lower court decision unconstitutional unless the state legislature
provided compensation within a certain timeframe set by the reviewing court. 195
Under either approach, the change in the law would be upheld so long as
property owners received compensation.
The advantage of Thompson's remedies is that they allow the state to make
the final decision regarding whether to change its property law. Federalism
concerns are one of the main objections raised by opponents of a judicial
takings doctrine, who argue that such a doctrine would impair the ability of
for prevailing on a judicial takings claim"' (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson, supra
note 24, at 1512)).
189 Thompson, supra note 24, at 1496.
190M. at 1497.
191 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
192 See Thompson, supra note 24, at 1513.
19 3 See id.
194 See id. at 1522.
195 See id.
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state courts to evolve state property law. 196 Thompson's two suggested
remedies largely allay these concerns because they allow state courts to change
property law so long as the state complies with the Fifth Amendment
requirement of just compensation.
B. David Sarratt's Approach: The "Law-Making " vs. "Law-Finding"
Test
David Sarratt proposed an innovative approach to judicial takings that
equated state judicial decisions with state legislative decisions. He claimed that
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 197 the Supreme Court ruled that absent a
contrary indication from a state, federal courts must treat state judge-made law
as equivalent to state statutory law. 198 Drawing upon that principle, he argued
that "Erie imposes the obligation to treat state law created by the judiciary as
real state law, which is in turn capable of effecting a taking."' 199
After finding the foundation for a judicial takings doctrine in the Erie
Doctrine, Sarratt suggested a judicial takings approach. The key inquiry that a
reviewing court should make is "whether the state court was wearing its
lawmaking hat or its law-finding hat. '200 To answer this question the court
should use Justice Stewart's unpredictability test.20 1 Essentially, then, Sarratt
proposed an unpredictability test. If the lower court decision effects a sudden
and unpredictable change in state property law, the court is making law and
taking property.202 On the other hand, if the lower court decision is reasonably
predictable, the court is finding law, and no taking has occurred. 20 3
Sarratt's approach suffers from the same disability that afflicts Justice
Stewart and Professor Thompson's similar approaches. As Justice Scalia
196 See id. at 1509 (observing that "the most frequently heard objection [to a judicial
takings doctrine] is that the development and specification of property law is a matter for the
state courts, and that federal courts should not interfere with this process through assertion of
the takings protections").
197 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
198 Sarratt, supra note 179, at 1527 (stating that "[t]he constitutional rule of Erie... is
simply that the national government must respect a state's right to choose the voice through
which it articulates its law").
199M. at 1528. Sarratt further stated that "Erie recognized that state judges should be
presumed not only to be authoritative law-finders but also lawmakers, empowered to
announce the will of the state-to willfully change the law. It follows, however, that the will
of the state is subject to the takings protections." Id. at 1529.
200Id. at 1530.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203M. Sarratt tied in his test to the Court's discussion of "background principles" in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See Sarratt, supra note 179,
at 1530-31. If the lower court's holding is consistent with "background principles" of state
law, the court is finding law and is not effecting a taking. See id. at 1533.
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pointed out, the predictability of a court's decision has little bearing on whether
the decision has taken property.204
C. Benjamin Barros's Approach: Distinguish Between Private-Public
Transfers and Private-Private Transfers
Professor Benjamin Barros proposed yet a third approach to determining
whether a judicial taking has occurred.20 5 He viewed formulating a special test
for judicial takings as unnecessary. 20 6 Rather, he suggested that "[a] judicial
action should be considered a taking under the Just Compensation Clause if the
equivalent action would be a taking if performed by the legislature or the
executive."207 Since the Takings Clause is not directed to a specific branch of
government but applies equally to the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary, the same approach should apply to all three. 208
Furthermore, Barros contended that the Takings Clause should apply only
to situations in which a court has takenprivate property and turned it into public
property-a "private-public transfer." 20 9 It should not apply when a court has
taken property from one private party and transferred it to another-a "private-
private transfer."210 For example, if a court changed the law so as to move the
seaward boundary of private beachfront property inward, what was previously
private property would become public property, and the Takings Clause would
apply.211 But if a court changed the law so as to destroy a previously existing
easement, the property interest would shift from one private person (the owner
of the dominant estate) to another private person (the owner of the servient
estate), and the Takings Clause would not apply. 212
Barros supported this distinction with four arguments. First, he contended
that the word "taken" in the Fifth Amendment applies more naturally to private-
public transfers than to private-private transfers.213 Although he conceded that a
private-private transfer "deprives" the private party of its property, he argued
that only a private-public transfer "takes" property.214 Second, he pointed out
204 See supra text accompanying note 158.
205 See Barros, supra note 18, at 917.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See id. at 919 ("The branches of government are equivalent in [the Takings Clause]
context, and there is no need to create a unique standard for judicial takings.").209 See id.
2 10 See id.
211 See Barros, supra note 18, at 920.2 12 See id.
213Id. at 921. Barros argues that "[i]t is natural to read the word 'taken' in the Just
Compensation Clause as applying to those circumstances where the government action
transfers the property interest from a private person to the government." Id. at 921. "In a
private-private transfer, in contrast, the government action does not take property in the
same way." Id.
214Id. at 922.
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that few of the Court's regulatory takings cases support applying the Takings
Clause to a private-private transfer. 215 Third, he argued that Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion in STBR does not support applying the Takings Clause to a
private-private transfer.216 Fourth, limiting the judicial takings doctrine to
private-public takings would in large part avoid the potential of myriads of
judicial takings claims inundating the federal courts' dockets. 217 If the judicial
takings doctrine were cabined to exclude private-private transfers, federal courts
would likely avoid a potential deluge of litigation.
One additional argument supports Barros's position. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that the primary reason for the Takings Clause is to
prevent "[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."218
If a court decision transfers property from one party to another, fairness does
not seem to require that the public bear the cost of that transfer. Thus, the policy
underlying the Takings Clause would not require the reviewing court to apply a
judicial takings analysis to a private-private transfer.
In Barros's opinion, courts should analyze private-private transfers under
the Due Process Clause. 219 He suggested that "private-private transactions may
'deprive' owners of property interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause even if they do not 'take' those interests within the meaning of the Just
Compensation Clause." 220 He appeared to agree with Justice Kennedy that
judicial decisions that "'eliminate[] or substantially change[] established
property rights' violate substantive due process. 221 Barros's approach here
2 15 See id. at 922-26.
2 16 Id. at 930; cf Mulvaney, supra note 44, at 263 (concluding that "to the extent that the
plurality's broad vision of a judicial takings doctrine is based on treatment of the branches as
equivalent, the plurality's standard may well be applicable to new rules announced in
adjudications of disputes between private parties"). Barros's argument on this point is
slightly less than compelling. Justice Scalia stated that "though the classic taking is a transfer
of property to the State or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause
applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing." Stop the Beach Renourishment v.
Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Barros contends that when read in context Justice Scalia's statement does not actually
support applying the judicial takings doctrine to private-private transfers. See Barros, supra
note 18, at 930-31. Perhaps a better argument would be that in STBR, Justice Scalia was
dealing with a case involving an alleged private-public transfer only. He most likely did not
consider the effect his broad language would have upon a private-private transfer.2 17 See Barros, supra note 18, at 958-59.
2 18 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).2 19 Barros, supra note 18, at 940 (concluding that "[s]ubstantive due process therefore
should offer the only avenue for review of the substance of a government act that results in a
private-private transfer").
220Id. at 938.
221 See id. (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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seems sound since the Supreme Court has held that a private-private transfer
violates due process. 222
Barros contemplated that a court might have to engage in a due process
inquiry and a takings inquiry in the same case. As seen in Part VII, this Note
extends that thought by arguing that courts should engage in both inquiries in
most judicial takings cases.
Finally, Barros argued that the proper remedy for a judicial taking should be
to invalidate the court decision that accomplished the taking.223 Similarly, he
concluded that invalidation is also the proper remedy for a court decision that
violates due process. 224
D. Eduardo M Pehialver and Lior Strahilevitz's Approach: Distinguish
Between Intentional Takings and Unintentional Deprivations of Property
In an insightful, recent article, Professors Pefialver and Strahilevitz attempt
to "delineate the boundaries between a judicial taking and a violation of the
Constitution's due process protections." 225 The boundary, they suggest, should
be marked by the court's intent.226 The Takings Clause is implicated "[w]here a
judicial decision intentionally seizes private property in order to achieve a
legitimate public end. '227 But "where the judiciary does not intend to
appropriate private owner's property, as well as when the diminution of private
property rights results from a judicial action that serves no legitimate public
purpose," the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the appropriate
constitutional provision to apply.228 To support this intent-based distinction,
Pefialver and Strahilevitz focus on the word "for" in the Takings Clause.229
("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
222 See Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (stating that "[t]he taking by
a state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for
the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth
Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States"); see also Mulvaney, supra
note 44, at 252 (predicting that "the Takings Clause might require compensation-
depending on the severity of the burden on private property rights and the distribution of that
burden-only 'in the event of otherwise proper interference,' that is, in the event that the
governmental act is related to a 'public use"' (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543)).223 See Barros, supra note 18, at 955 (concluding that "Justice Scalia had the better
argument on this issue").224 See id. at 954 (noting that "inverse condemnation... should not be available for
cases seeking redress for deprivations of property in violation of substantive or procedural
due process").225 Eduardo M. Pefialver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
97 CORNELL L. REv. 305,306 (2012).
2 2 6 See id at 312.
227Id
"
2 2 8 Id.
229Id. at 321.
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compensation." 230) They contend that "for" indicates a requirement of
intentionality that defines the boundary of the Takings Clause's applicability.231
They also point to cases falling within the regulatory takings context that
differentiate between intentional takings, to which courts apply the Takings
Clause, and unintentional deprivations of property, which are treated as
government torts.232
As far as remedies are concerned, Pefialver and Strahilevitz conclude that
Justice Kennedy had the better position in STBR. 2 33 A violation of the Takings
Clause is remedied by forcing the state to provide just compensation; a due
process violation, on the other hand, requires invalidation. 234
By attempting to delineate the boundary between the Takings Clause and
due process considerations in the context of judicial takings, Pefialver and
Strahilevitz continue the debate that Justices Scalia and Kennedy started in
STBR. But it is unclear why courts need to choose between the Due Process
Clause and the Takings Clause when evaluating a judicial takings claim.
Instead, as explained immediately below in Part VII, courts should apply both
provisions. Furthermore, whether or not a court intended to take property seems
relatively unimportant, especially from the perspective of the property owner.235
The important question is not what the court intended to do, but what the court
in fact did. To be constitutional, a judicial decision that changes property law
must pass scrutiny under both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause,
and reviewing courts should not feel obliged to choose between the two.
230 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
231 Pefialver & Strahilevitz, supra note 225, at 312, 321. Pefialver and Strahilevitz, like
Barros, point to the use of the verb "deprive" in the Due Process Clause and the use of the
verb "take" in the Takings Clause, as supporting their intent-based approach.
Perhaps the difference between taking property and depriving someone of property is
akin to the distinction between picking someone's pocket and, having found someone's
wallet, returning it to the wrong person. If the government imposes a loss without the
intent to harness private property to accomplish a public purpose, it has not "taken" that
property "for public use," though it might still have violated the owner's constitutional
rights.
Id. at 318. (footnote omitted).
232 d. at 319.
233 See id. at 338 n.1 19 (pointing out that in Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528
(2005), nine justices supported compensation as the correct remedy for a Takings Clause
violation).
2 3 4 See id. at 313.
235 Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585 (D. Haw. 1977) (stating that "[t]he
Constitution does not measure the taking of property by what a court may say or even what
it may intend; the measure is by the result"). Admittedly, Ariyoshi was a due process case.
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VII. A PROPOSED TEST FOR JUDICIAL TAKINGS
Although the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Kennedy in STBR
was sharp, their positions can be reconciled to a certain extent. Combining
certain aspects of their respective positions produces a stronger and more
comprehensive standard for judicial takings.
The debate between Justices Scalia and Kennedy (over whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause should
apply to a state court redefinition of property) creates a false dichotomy. The
mechanism by which the Bill of Rights applies to the states, the Incorporation
Doctrine, suggests that both provisions should apply.236 Before 1897, the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government and not to the states.237 But in
1897, the Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.238 Therefore, the Takings Clause would not apply to a state
judicial decision were it not for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. To isolate the Takings Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment, as
Justice Scalia attempted to do, is to ignore the fact that the Takings Clause
applies to a state court decision only through the Due Process Clause.
Yet Justice Kennedy's position ignores the language of the Takings Clause.
Written in the passive voice, the Takings Clause applies anytime the
government takes private property, regardless of whether the taking is done by
the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary. As Justice Scalia pointed out,
Supreme Court precedent supports this reading of the Fifth Amendment.239
Furthermore, applying only the Due Process Clause to a judicial takings
claim ignores the distinction the Court has drawn between the "effects" and the
"underlying validity" of a governmental action that is challenged as a taking. In
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,240 the Court rejected the "substantially advances"
test formerly applied to alleged regulatory takings.241 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice O'Connor declared that the "substantially advances" test, which
finds a taking when a governmental regulation "'does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests,"' is "not a valid method of discerning whether private
236 See Walston, supra note 24, at 414.
237 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-51 (1833); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 7, at 491-92.238 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 639-40.239 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2601-02 (2010) (plurality opinion); see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 575 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 233-34.
240 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
24 1 Id. at 540. The Court first set forth the "substantially advances" test in Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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property has been 'taken' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." 242 Instead,
explained O'Connor, the "substantially advances" test is properly categorized as
a due process analysis because "[i]t asks, in essence, whether a regulation of
private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose." 243 A
regulation that does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest "may be
so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause." 244 In
contrast to due process considerations, which relate to the regulation's
"underlying validity," the Takings Clause focuses on the regulation's effect.245
Assuming a regulation is a valid exercise of governmental power, the Takings
Clause requires a court to investigate whether the effect of the regulation is a
taking of private property.246
Of course, Lingle dealt with a regulatory takings issue. But the basic
principle set forth in Lingle seems equally applicable to judicial takings. Lingle
suggests that when approaching a judicial takings claim, a court must first
ascertain whether the lower court decision was a valid exercise of judicial
authority under the Due Process Clause. After ensuring that due process
requirements were satisfied, the court should next examine the effects of the
lower court decision to see whether it constitutes a taking of private property. 247
In the following pages, this Note explains more fully what such a two-
pronged judicial takings test might look like. When describing the test, this
Note uses the term "reviewing court" when referring to the court hearing the
judicial takings claim and the term "lower court" when referring to the court
alleged to have committed the taking. This vagueness is intentional and is
designed to reinforce the point that almost any court can use the proposed
test.248 Admittedly, the term "lower court" is not entirely accurate because a
242 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540, 542.243 See id. at 542.
244 Id
2 4 5 See id. at 543.
246 See id. ("Instead of addressing a challenged regulation's effect on private property,
the 'substantially advances' inquiry probes the regulation's underlying validity. But such an
inquiry is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a
taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a
valid public purpose.").2 47 The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii employed an approach somewhat
similar to the one suggested here. See supra Part III.C. However, the court merged the
takings inquiry into substantive due process considerations. Under Lingle, the due process
inquiry is separate from the takings inquiry.
248 Besides the U.S. Supreme Court, perhaps the most obvious court to use the test
would be a state supreme court hearing a judicial takings claim based on a lower state court
decision. A federal district court could apply the test to a judicial takings claim based on i
state court decision, although various procedural issues might limit the ability of a lower
federal court to hear a judicial takings claim based on a state court decision. Although it
would create an unusual situation, the test could even be applied by a lower state court
hearing a judicial takings claim based on a state supreme court decision. See Fein, supra
note 3, at 781-82. Finally, a court could apply the substantive due process aspect of the first
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situation might arise in which a federal district court or even a lower state court
could hear a takings claim based on a state supreme court decision.
249
Nonetheless, "lower court" promotes consistency and is used for that reason.
A. Due Process Prong: The "Underlying Validity" Inquiry
When a reviewing court faces a claim that a lower court decision redefined
property law in such a way as to deprive the claimant of a property right, the
reviewing court should first examine the decision to see whether it comports
with due process. That is, it should evaluate the "underlying validity" of the
lower court decision.250 This due process analysis must precede any
examination under the Takings Clause since "the Takings Clause presupposes
that" the lower court's decision is a valid exercise of judicial authority.251
Furthermore, the reviewing court should inquire into both the procedural and
substantive aspects of due process.
1. Procedural Due Process
The procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause requires that the lower
court have afforded the claimant a meaningful opportunity to be heard.252
Professor Barros pointed out that a procedural due process issue is most likely
to arise when a state supreme court redefines property rights.253 If a lower state
court redefines property rights, the aggrieved property owner can argue his case
before the state supreme court, thus allowing him a meaningful opportunity to
be heard.254 But if a state supreme court sua sponte redefines property rights,
the aggrieved property owner would need to either petition the U.S. Supreme
Court for certiorari or petition the state supreme court for rehearing. 255 If both
petitions were denied, the property owner would be on strong ground in arguing
that he was not afforded procedural due process. 256 His only recourse in that
situation would be to bring a judicial takings claim in federal district court. 257
prong and the takings prong to a judicial takings claim brought by a third party in a collateral
suit.249 Various procedural issues might limit the ability of a federal district court to hear a
judicial takings claim based on a state supreme court decision. These procedural issues-the
Williamson County exhaustion requirements, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and res
judicata-exceed the scope of this Note. For two excellent articles addressing these issues in
depth, see generally Barros, supra note 18, and Fein, supra note 3.250 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
251 See id
2 52 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70 (1972); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930).2 53 See Barros, supra note 18, at 941.
254Id. at 940.
255Id. at 941.
2561d.; see also Fein, supra note 3, at 779 (predicting that "[i]f the state supreme court's
sua sponte change to property law was so unpredictable and unexpected that a reasonable
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2. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause guarantees a substantive as well as a procedural
due process right. Normally, in the realm of economic rights, substantive due
process requires only that a law be "rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose."258 In the context of regulatory takings, the Supreme
Court has stated that "a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the
Due Process Clause." 259 Therefore, it appears that Justice Kennedy is partially
right to assert that "[t]he Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a
judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property
rights.., is 'arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause."2 60
Not just any judicial decision that alters property rights should be found to
violate substantive due process requirements. Rather, borrowing from the
unpredictability test suggested by Justice Stewart, only a decision that
"constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents" should be held to violate substantive due process.261 A state court
decision that changes state law suddenly and unpredictably could easily be
found so arbitrary or irrational as to violate the guarantee of due process. In the
words of one author, "When changed definitions exceed certain bounds of
reasonableness and fairness, the courts are constrained by constitutional due
process." 262
plaintiff would not have thought to argue [a judicial takings claim] in the alternative, the
plaintiff would likely have a valid procedural due process claim for lack of an opportunity to
be heard").
257 However, allowing a federal district court to hear a judicial takings claim based on a
state supreme court decision might violate the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Fein, supra
note 3, at 781-82. But see Barros, supra note 18, at 949 (suggesting that the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine should not apply because "[i]n a judicial takings case.., the complaining
property owner is not arguing that the state courts simply decided a legal issue
incorrectly... [but is instead] arguing that the state court violated the Constitution by taking
property without compensation"). The two Hawaii cases, described above in Part IV,
provide examples of a state supreme court denying property owners their right to procedural
due process. See id. at 954 (citing Sotomura v. Cnty. of Haw., 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw.
1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977)). In those cases, the Hawaii
Supreme Court sua sponte altered state property law in a way that deprived the property
owners of property rights that they possessed before the court decisions. In both cases the
federal district court found, and rightly so, that the property owners had been deprived of
their procedural due process rights since they were not afforded the chance to defend their
property ownership. See Sotomura, 460 F. Supp. at 477-78; Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. at 580.
2 5 8 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 540.
25 9 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
260 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2615 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
261 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
262 Walston, supra note 24, at 435.
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State courts should be free to evolve state property law, but if they do so in
an arbitrary or capricious way their decisions risk violating substantive due
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the reviewing court
distinguish between state court decisions that shape property law in a principled
and measured manner and decisions that effect sudden or irrational changes. 263
3. Remedy: Invalidation
If the reviewing court finds that a lower court decision violated the Due
Process Clause, it should invalidate that decision.2 64 "[I]f a government action
is found to be impermissible-for instance because it ... is so arbitrary as to
violate due process-that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation
can authorize such action. '265
B. Takings Clause Prong: The "Effects" Inquiry
Once the reviewing court concludes that a lower court decision meets the
requirements of due process, it should next analyze the decision under the
Takings Clause to see whether the decision accomplished a taking of property.
In the context of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has indicated that a due
process inquiry is insufficient to determine whether property has been taken
under the Fifth Amendment.266 A takings claim requires that the reviewing
court examine the lower court decision's "effects" on private property. 267
1. Test
Under this prong, the reviewing court would do well to apply the test
formulated by Justice Scalia. It should find a judicial taking when "a court
declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer
exists." 268 Under Justice Scalia's test, a taking can be found even if the lower
court decision was not so arbitrary or irrational as to run afoul of substantive
26 3 See Barros, supra note 18, at 938.
264 See Walston, supra note 24, at 43 5-36.
2 65 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); see also Barros, supra note
18, at 954 (observing that "inverse condemnation ... can only be had in a case involving a
taking under the Just Compensation Clause, and should not be available for cases seeking
redress for deprivations of property in violation of substantive or procedural due process").
266 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
267 See id. at 543.
268 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted); cf Barros, supra note 18, at 917.
Professor Barros argues that "there is no need for a unique test for judicial takings. A
judicial action should be considered a taking under the Just Compensation Clause if the
equivalent action would be a taking if performed by the legislature or the executive branch."
See id.
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due process. 269 "What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly
confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken was
established. '270 If the reviewing court is a federal court, when employing
Justice Scalia's test it should be careful to follow his rule of deference to the
state court's interpretation of state property law.271 Only if the right was clearly
established under state law should the federal court find a judicial taking.
The reviewing court should not simply apply to a judicial takings claim the
same takings analysis used for regulatory takings. 272 Justice Scalia's established
right test recognizes the fundamental difference between a judicial taking and a
regulatory taking. When a court issues a decision, it usually goes to great pains
to reconcile its holding with preexisting law. 273 Almost never will a court
blatantly proclaim that its decision effected a dramatic change in the law. When
a state legislature enacts a statute, however, a reasonable assumption is that the
statute is a departure from preexisting law.2 74 Legislators enact statutes because
they want to change the law. A judicial takings test should therefore be tailored
to address this basic difference between court decisions and statutes. 275 Justice
Scalia's test is well designed to ferret out cases where a court, although
claiming that its holding is consistent with prior law, has in reality changed the
law in such a way as to take property.
The reviewing court should apply this takings analysis only to those court
decisions that turn private property into public property. As discussed above,
Barros suggested that in the judicial takings context, the Takings Clause applies
only to situations in which a court has turned a previously private property right
2 69 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
2701d
271 See id. at 2608 n.9.
2 72 But see Barros, supra note 18, at 917.
2 73 See Sarratt, supra note 179, at 1490 (observing that "[i]t is in the nature of courts to
say what the law is and what it has always been").
274Md. at 1491 (observing that "[s]tatutes are, generally speaking, assumed to be new
rules replacing common law background principles"); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
134 (1876) (stating that "the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstance").27 5 Barros recognizes this basic difference between judicial takings and legislative or
executive takings. He observes:
The judicial takings fact pattern, however, does present some unique issues that
typically are not present in equivalent cases involving the legislature or executive
branch. If any of the branches made an explicit change in property law, then a
reviewing federal court would have relatively little difficulty in evaluating the
constitutionality of this change. If the change were implicit, however, a constitutional
review would require interpretation of the state's property law.
Barros, supra note 18, at 932. Nonetheless, he does not view this difference as supporting a
unique test for judicial takings. See id.
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into a public property right.276 Private-private transfers should be analyzed
under the Due Process Clause. 277
2. Remedy: The State 's Choice
If a reviewing court finds that a court decision accomplished a judicial
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, it should allow the state to decide
whether to invalidate the court decision or to uphold the decision and provide
just compensation. When the Supreme Court finds a regulatory taking, it leaves
it up to the state government to decide whether to revoke the regulation or
exercise eminent domain. 278 A reviewing court should take the same approach
in the judicial takings context. If the state court decision complied with due
process but nonetheless accomplished a taking, under the Fifth Amendment the
only problem with the court's action is that the taking was uncompensated. The
Supreme Court has explained that the Takings Clause "does not prohibit the
taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power. '279 The Takings Clause allows a governmental entity to take property so
long as it provides compensation. 280 If, as Justice Scalia argued, the Takings
Clause applies to the judicial branch as well as to the legislative and executive
branches, the remedy for a judicial taking should be the same as the remedy for
a legislative or executive taking.
Thompson's suggested remedies are valuable here. As discussed earlier,281
he suggested two possible approaches to remedying a judicial taking-the
Automatic Compensation Approach and the Legislative Choice Approach.282
Of the two, the Legislative Choice Approach is preferable in that it gives the
state legislature the final say on whether the state will pay compensation to
accomplish a constitutional taking. Under this approach, the reviewing court
sets a deadline by which the state legislature must award compensation for the
judicial taking.283 If the legislature declines to award compensation before the
deadline, the lower court decision is invalidated. 284 According to Thompson,
the advantage of this approach is that "[t]he legislature remains free to decline
paying compensation if it wishes. But, if the legislature chooses not to
276 See id. at 919; see also supra Part VI.C.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
278 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987) (stating that "[o]nce a court determines that a taking has occurred, the
government retains the whole range of options already available-amendment of the
regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain").
2791d. at 314.
280 See id.; see also Echeverria, supra note 159, at 482 (describing "Justice Scalia's
assertion that the remedy for judicial takings should not be limited to financial
compensation" as "anomalous").28 1 See supra Part VI.A.
282 Thompson, supra note 24, at 1513.
2 8 3 1d. at 1522.
2 8 4 1d.
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compensate, the state does not retain the benefit of the judicial property
change."285
VIII. THE Two-PRONGED TAKINGS TEST APPLIED
A brief example will illustrate how this proposed two-pronged test would
apply to a judicial takings claim. Consider the facts of the well-known beach-
access case Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass 'n.286 The case involved a
dispute over the public's right to access a beach owned by a "quasi-public
body." 287 The Bay Head Improvement Association (BHIA) was a private,
nonprofit corporation that owned and leased several parcels of land along the
New Jersey shore. 288 The BHIA maintained the beaches for the benefit of its.
members, the residents of the Borough of Bay Head.289 During the summer,
only members were allowed to use the beaches during the daytime. 290 Unhappy
with this restricted membership, the nearby Borough of Point Pleasant sued the
BHIA, seeking access to the BHIA's beaches for Point Pleasant residents.29 1
Under the public trust doctrine as it existed in New Jersey before Matthews, the
public had the right to use the foreshore 292 for navigation and fishing as well as
for recreational uses such as swimming.293 Also, the public had the right to
enjoy the dry sand area 294 of beaches owned by municipalities.295 However, the
public did not have the right to use the dry sand area of privately owned
beaches.
285I. at 1520-21.
286471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
287I. at 358. Admittedly, the quasi-public nature of the BHIA might factor into a
reviewing court's takings analysis. For purposes of this illustration, though, assume the court
would treat the BHIA as a normal private landowner.
288Id. at 359.
2 89 Id.
290Id. The public was allowed to use the beach in the early morning and evening. Id.
291Id. at 358. Two individuals, a resident of Point Pleasant who wanted to swim at Bay
Head and a Public Advocate, joined as plaintiffs. Id. The Borough of Point Pleasant
eventually "ceased pursuing the litigation" and "the Public Advocate became the primary
moving party." Id.
292 The foreshore is "the land below the mean average high water mark where the tide
ebbs and flows." Matthews, 471 A.2d at 362-63.29 3 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J.
1972) (holding that "the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives
of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming and other shore activities").
294 "The dry sand area is generally defined as the land west (landward) of the high water
mark to the vegetation line or where there is no vegetation to a seawall, road, parking lot or
boardwalk." Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358 n.1.2 95 See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1972) (holding that "in
New Jersey, a proper application of the Public Trust Doctrine requires that the municipally
owned upland sand area adjacent to the tidal waters must be open to all on equal terms and
without preference").
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In Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the public trust
doctrine to privately owned dry sand beaches. 296 It held that the public trust
"doctrine warrants the public's use of the [privately owned] upland dry sand
area subject to an accommodation of the interests of the owner. '297 Essentially,
then, by extending the public trust doctrine to privately owned dry sand areas,
the court deprived private beach owners-in this case the BHIA-of a property
right, namely, their right to exclude the public from the dry sand area of their
property.
The facts of Matthews are amenable to the two-pronged judicial takings test
proposed in this Note.298 The reviewing court would first apply the "underlying
validity" prong of the test. As noted earlier, 299 a case where a state supreme
court decision accomplishes the alleged taking will often create an issue of
procedural due process. Whether the parties actually argued the extension of the
public trust doctrine is unclear from the case itself. If the BHIA was afforded an
opportunity to contest the extension of the public trust doctrine, the requirement
of a meaningful opportunity to be heard would likely be satisfied. But if the
court decided the issue sua sponte and denied a petition for rehearing, its actions
might have violated procedural due process. If so, the reviewing court would
invalidate its decision.
Assuming the reviewing court found that the New Jersey Supreme Court
complied with procedural due process, it would next evaluate the decision under
the substantive aspect of due process. It would look at New Jersey property law
before Matthews to see whether Matthews effected a sudden, unpredictable
change in the law. Since the New Jersey Supreme Court had been steadily
expanding the public trust doctrine before Matthews-first to recreational uses
of the foreshore and then to municipally owned dry sand areas-the Matthews
decision does not appear so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.
Rather, it looks as though the New Jersey Supreme Court was simply taking the
next logical step in its gradual expansion of the public trust doctrine. State
courts must be permitted to shape their own property law in a principled
manner. The reviewing court would most likely not find a violation of
substantive due process on these facts.
296 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
297 Id. The court went on to say:
While the public's rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with the rights enjoyed
in municipal beaches, private landowners may not in all instances prevent the public
from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded
reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry
sand.
Id. at 365-66. The court also required the BIHA, as a "quasi-public" organization, to open
up its membership to the general public. See id. at 367.
298 The BHIA actually did petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but
its petition was denied. See Bay Head Improvement Ass'n v. Matthews, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)
(mem.).299 See supra Part VII.A. 1.
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If it found that the Matthews decision passed the first prong of the test, the
reviewing court would move to the "effects" prong. Here it would ask whether
the decision eliminated an established right of private property. Whether the
decision was predictable or foreseeable is irrelevant under this prong of the test.
The key issue is whether the decision turned an established private property
right into a public property right. Before Matthews, the BHIA had the right to
exclude the public from the dry sand area of its beaches. After Matthews, it was
required to grant the public reasonable access to the dry sand. Matthews,
therefore, declared that the BHIA's right to exclude no longer existed. Because
it took the BHIA's property right without providing compensation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
After finding that the Matthews decision was an unconstitutional taking of
property, the reviewing court would give the New Jersey legislature the option
of providing compensation. If the legislature decided that the benefits of
granting the public access to the dry sand areas of its shoreline were worth the
cost, it would compensate the taking. The taking would then be constitutional.
But if the legislature decided not to provide compensation, the Matthews
decision would be invalidated. In the end, the choice would be the state's to
make.
IX. CONCLUSION
STBR indicated that the Supreme Court will not allow a state court to alter
property law in such a way that it takes private property. Unfortunately, the
Court provided little guidance for courts faced with judicial takings claims. This
Note has proposed a two-pronged test that reviewing courts should apply when
resolving a judicial takings claim. By applying both an "underlying validity"
inquiry and an "effects" inquiry, each with a distinct remedy, the reviewing
court will ensure that each judicial takings claim receives a comprehensive and
principled constitutional analysis.
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